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            Abstract
Past research has demonstrated that cognitive triage (weak-strong-weak recall pattern) is a robust effect
that optimizes children’s recall.  The aim of the current research was to determine whether adults’ free
recall also exhibits triage and whether cognitive triage is less marked with older than younger adults’
recall.  Younger and older adults memorized 16 unrelated words until all items were recalled perfectly.
The triage pattern existed for both of the younger and older adults’ recall and there was evidence for age
differences in triage.  Our results are consistent with claims of greater verbatim forgetting and increased
susceptibility to output interference with age in adulthood.  Further research is needed to determine
whether fuzzy-trace theory adequately explains the aging of triage and what factors play a role in the
development of this pattern of recall in adulthood.
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            Invariance of Cognitive Triage in the Development of Recall in Adulthood
          In most examinations of memory development, free-recall is the paradigm of choice, which is not
that surprising given that this is the most common method of tapping everyday memory.  A number of
earlier theories (one-process accounts of recall) such as Marbe’s Law (e.g., Marbe, 1901, cited in Brainerd,
Reyna, & Howe, 1990) as well as contemporary theories like the association network models (e.g.,
Anderson & Bower, 1973), the resource hypotheses (e.g., Bjorklund & Muir, 1988), and relative strength
models (e.g., Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Wixted, Ghadisha, & Vera, 1997), predict that during free
recall, stronger items will present themselves to consciousness before weaker items, and therefore, will be
reported in that order.  However, in studies with children and young adults, Brainerd and his colleagues
(for a review, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2001) did not obtain the stronger-weaker sequence of recall but rather
found a weaker-stronger-weaker order, which has been labelled the cognitive triage effect because of its
similarity to the well-known medical procedure of treating the most difficult cases first.
        Because the majority of research on cognitive triage has been performed with children, where findings
indicate that triage optimizes recall (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1990), it is of great theoretical and practical
importance to replicate this effect with young adults and determine whether this effect exists in older
adults’ recall.  The aim of the present study, then, is to extend our understanding of cognitive triage by
investigating the relationship between recall order and memory strength during the latter portion of the life
span (i.e., from younger to older adulthood) and to determine whether this relationship varies across age.
The theoretical foundation for cognitive triage, fuzzy-trace theory (FTT), is reviewed below and is
followed by a description of possible developmental differences in triage during adulthood.  An
experiment, the first of its kind in the literature, is then described, one that examines developmental
differences in triage in adults’ free recall.
According to the FTT (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2001), two retrieval operations are available during
recall, namely, direct access of verbatim traces and reconstruction of gist traces.  Verbatim traces are
detailed, well-articulated representations that preserve recently encoded information whereas gist or fuzzy
traces refer to schematic, degenerate representations that preserve only the gist of recently encoded
information.  Direct access to verbatim traces predominates at the start of output and is the more accurate
of the two retrieval operations.  However, verbatim memory traces are especially vulnerable to output
interference that accumulates during the course of recall (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001).  A greater number of
targets can be output if weaker verbatim traces are recalled earlier when interference is low, followed by
stronger verbatim traces, resulting in a weak ( strong ordering. Once the initial verbatim traces are
exhausted, recall shifts to reconstruction of gist traces in a stronger ( weaker sequence.  Because gist traces
are not as vulnerable to output interference, as the stronger gist items are recalled, interference dissipates
allowing recall of weak items in late output queues.  Thus, the differential sensitivity of verbatim and gist
traces to output interference leads to the overall triage (weak ( strong ( weak) pattern in recall by outputting
items in queues where their memory traces are minimally impacted.
  According to FTT, episodic activation and output interference vary systematically across a free
recall test.  During the course of an experiment, a network of episodic relationships becomes formed
between a word’s core semantic representation, contextual cues, and the core representations of the other
words.  Retrieving a word on a recall test produces priming of this network, known as episodic activation,
which facilitates the recall of further words. The amount of activation that is released when a word is
recalled depends on its memory strength. Because stronger core traces capture more episodic information
than weaker core traces, words with greater memory strength release more activation. As more words are
read out during the protocol, the overall level of episodic activation mounts, which aids recall of the
remaining words in the target set.
        However, recalling words does not uniformly facilitate recall of other words. The operations
that access traces and send them on to the motor control systems to produce articulation create
different types of off-task noise (Dempster, 1992, 1993; Hadley, Healy, & Murdock, 1992; Hasher
& Zacks, 1988; Howe & Rabinowitz, 1989).  For example, item-specific information that has
already been recalled and is therefore irrelevant to subsequent recall may be recoded into memory
and compete for subsequent retrieval (Brainerd & Reyna, 1989; Hadley et al., 1992; Reyna &
Brainerd, 1989). The current level of episodic activation is believed to determine the amount of
output interference that a word generates when
it is recalled; there is less net interference released when the network of episodic relationships is
highly primed than when it is weakly primed. At the beginning of a memory test, episodic
activation and output interference begin to accumulate. The episodic network will continue to be
primed as words are recalled, reaching its asymptote at the end of the protocol. However, output
interference should build most quickly at the beginning of a test, when episodic activation is low,
reach its asymptote somewhere in the middle of a protocol, when there is ample episodic
activation, and subside from then on, as the episodic network becomes totally primed. Thus, there
are two points during a recall test when the interference level is low and weaker traces can be read
out - namely, at the beginning of a test, before much interference has been generated, and at the
end of a test, when interference is being eliminated by high episodic activation.
As study-test trials progress in a list-learning study, participants are able to form in situ memory
strengths of items so that previously recalled items gain episodic strength in memory relative to non-
recalled items (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001).  At criterion, when learning is complete, the episodic
relationships between items are fully established, allowing participants to make reliable discriminations
between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ items to best maximize their output through triage – indeed, this triage pattern
has been found to enhance recall (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001).
                       With respect to developmental differences, the data are consistent with the idea that younger
children’s recall generates more output interference than older children’s recall (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1990).
 According to FTT, it can be argued that deficits in performance on tasks, including dual-task paradigms
(e.g., Crossley & Hiscock, 1992), can be interpreted as output interference.  Developmental trends in these
deficits can be explained in terms of reductions in the susceptibility to such interference experienced by
older children and adults, something that should result in developmental differences in triage.  At the other
end of the developmental spectrum, if older adults experience more output interference than younger
adults, they, like young children, will be forced to switch from weaker to stronger items earlier in the
protocol.  This is exactly what has been found with younger versus older children (e.g., Brainerd et al.,
1990), but is yet to be examined between younger and older adults.  Indeed, if older adults experience more
output interference than younger adults, then age differences should be more apparent earlier in recall
protocols because output interference accumulates more rapidly.  Furthermore, if they experience more
rapid verbatim forgetting, then they will be forced to rely on reconstruction rather than direct access earlier
in the recall protocol than younger adults, something that would result in more errors, and perhaps more
learning trials, for older than younger adults.
              In the present study, younger and older adults memorized a list of 16 unrelated familiar words
until the entire list was correctly recalled on two consecutive free recall tests.  The aim of the study was to
determine whether the order of recall across the entire set of items is weaker-to-stronger-to-weaker and
whether there are age differences in the shape of this pattern.  In particular, if older adults experience more
output interference than younger adults, then they will be forced to switch from weaker to stronger items
earlier in the protocol than younger adults, leaving the remaining weak words to later in the output queue
when activation is highest and interference has lessened.  What this means is that triage curves for older
adults should have longer right than left arms than those produced by younger adults, something that is
very similar to the shape of the triage curves that have been found with younger versus older children (e.g.,
Brainerd et al., 1990).
            Method
Participants
        A total of 60 younger and 60 older adults, 30 males at each age level, participated in the experiment
(M = 21.90; SD = 3.04 and M = 73.72; SD = 7.19, respectively).  The younger adults were undergraduate
university students and the older adults were recruited primarily from local seniors’ university classes and
organizations.  All participants reported no major health or memory problems, were living independently
(i.e., without any assistance), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and most had some university
education.
Materials and Procedure
        Each participant was told that they would be shown 16 words, one at a time, and would be
required to recall as many words as possible after presentation.  They were also told that the goal
was to recall all of the words correctly twice in a row and that they would get as many study
opportunities as it took to do so.  Following the description of the free recall procedure, the
participant was administered the first study trial on the list of 16 nouns.  The Paivio, Yuille, and
Madigan (1968) norms were used to construct a list of 8 high-concrete and 8 low-concrete nouns
for one-third of the participants, a list of 8 high-frequency and 8 low-frequency nouns for another
third of the participants, and a list of 8 high and 8 low concrete nouns, half of which were high in
frequency and half of which were low in frequency.  Because there were no differences in triage
among the different word lists, the data were collapsed across list type.
A study trial initially involved presenting each word, via a card (in large text), for either 2
s or 5 s for both the younger and older adults.  However, the older adults found it difficult (and
many of them found it impossible) to learn the list items when the items were presented at a 2 s
rate; they became frustrated with the number of trials that were required to reach criterion (in
some cases 10 or more trials were needed).  With a 5 s presentation rate, the younger adults
typically reached criterion after one or two trials.  However, with a 2 s presentation rate, the
number of trials required by the younger adults to reach criterion (M = 6.65) was much closer to the
number of trials required by the older adults to reach criterion (M = 8.12).  As criterion learning was the
primary objective (cognitive triage has been found to be the most marked at criterion; Brainerd et al.,
1990), different presentation rates were used to minimize age differences in ability to achieve criterion, and
hence to minimize age differences in learning rate.  This procedure is frequently used in developmental
studies (both with children and adults) to equate task difficulty and to insure criterion learning within an
optimal number of study-test cycles (e.g., see Howe, 1990).  Of course, despite differences in presentation
rates, the degree of learning will not differ because all participants learned to a criterion of two consecutive
errorless recall trials (e.g., see Howe, 1988).
The order of word presentation on study trials was random.  After 30 s of performing a filler task
to prevent short-term memory and serial position effects, the individual was asked to recall as many of the
words as possible, in any order he or she wished.  The experimenter recorded the order in which the items
were presented and recalled.  The individual was administered further cycles of study/filler activity/test
until the entire list was correctly recalled on two consecutive free recall tests.  Once criterion was met (i.e.,
all items correctly recalled on two consecutive trials), all persons were debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
            Results
In order to compare results with those of past studies on triage, and to examine claims of greater
verbatim forgetting and increased susceptibility to output interference with age, similar analyses were
carried out as those reported by others (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1990).  As in prior triage research, an item in a
response set was classified as strong if it was successfully recalled on a previous trial and weak if it had not
been recalled previously.  As well, like previous research, we used two precriterion measures of recall
accuracy, namely, mean total errors per trial to criterion and the mean trial number of the last error.  Mean
total errors per trial reflects the mean number of times items were not recalled on each of the previous
trials, and is calculated by taking an average of the number of errors produced on each trial until criterion
learning is reached.  The mean trial of last error measure reflects the average number of trials participants
needed to meet criterion, and is calculated by taking the average of the last trial number in which
participants produced an error before reaching criterion.
Analyses indicated that there was a significant difference between the two age groups in the mean
total errors produced per trial, t(118) = 4.81, p < .001, with the older adults producing more errors (M =
1.58, SD = 0.62) than the younger adults (M = 1.09, SD = 0.47).  As well, the mean trial of last error was
greater for the older adults (M = 2.12; SD = 0.87) than for the younger adults (M = 1.31, SD = 0.65), t(118)
= 5.76, p < .001.  Thus, recall performance was poorer for the older than the younger adults.
Of most interest was the relationship between order of recall and recall accuracy.  That is, we
wished to corroborate previous reports of cognitive triage, as well as determine whether triage is less
marked with age.  The two experimentwise measures of recall accuracy, total errors to criterion and trial
number of last error, were plotted as a function of the words’ positions in the output queues on the two
criterion trials.  In Tables 1 and 2, we report the results as Vincentized quartiles (e.g., see Levine & Burke,
1972), the measure most frequently used in triage studies.
        The pattern that is indicative of the basic triage effect is a U-shaped relationship between
recall accuracy (as assessed by mean total errors per trial and mean trial of last error) and output
order such that words with low accuracy are recalled in the primacy and recency positions of the
protocols and words with high accuracy are recalled at intermediate positions.  It appears from the
inspection of Tables 1 and 2 that this pattern existed at both age levels.  This was statistically
verified by fitting the general linear equation,
Y = a + bX                                                                              Eq. 1,
and the general quadratic equation,
Y = a + bX + cX2                                                                          Eq. 2,
to the recall accuracy/recall order plots, where Y is a word’s position in the criterion recall queue,
X is a measure of overall recall accuracy (e.g., total errors to criterion, trial number of last error),
and a, b, and c are free parameters. If the relationship between recall accuracy and recall ordering
is U-shaped, then Eq. 2 will give a better description of this relationship than Eq. 1.  A total of 4
tests of this hypothesis were conducted for each of two criterion trials.  Polynomial regression
goodness-of-fit tests indicated that the general quadratic equation provided a better fit than the
general linear equation (and the general cubic equation) for both comparisons involving the first
criterion trial with both the younger and older adults (p < .01).  The amount of variance accounted for
by the quadratic fits was 91% and 93% for the younger adults and 83% and 83% for the older adults, for
each of the two measures, total errors and trial of last error, respectively.  Therefore, the plots of the
criterion 1 data conformed to the U-shaped cognitive triage functions that have been reported in previous
studies.
However, the results were slightly different with the plots of the criterion 2 data.
Polynomial regression goodness-of-fit tests indicated that the general quadratic equation provided
a better fit than the general linear equation (and the general cubic equation) for the total errors
measure for the younger adults (p < .01) and for both measures for the older adults (p < .05).  The
amount of variance accounted for by the quadratic fits was 59% for the younger adults for the total errors
measure, and 63% and 57% for the older adults, for each of the two measures, total errors and trial of last
error, respectively.  Therefore, the plots of the criterion 2 data basically conformed to the U-shaped
cognitive triage functions that have been reported in previous studies, but they certainly were not as
marked as they were with the criterion 1 data.
        Brainerd et al. (1990) reported two developmental differences that they observed in their
data.  First, they found that the positions in the output queue where recall was poorest varied with
age.  In particular, older children’s U-shaped curves were approximately symmetrical, whereas the
U-shaped curves produced by younger children had longer right than left arms.  They interpreted
this to mean that younger children’s recall generates more output interference than older
children’s recall.  It was of interest to determine whether there was any difference between
younger and older adults in the positions in the output queue where recall was poorest.  If such
differences existed, then they were more likely to be found with the criterion 1 data given the
stronger triage patterns at criterion 1 than 2.  To statistically verify whether there was an age
difference in when the very weakest words were read out, 2(Quartile: first and fourth) x 4(Item)
ANOVAs were carried out.  A total of 4 tests (2 age levels x 2 statistics of recall) were conducted
that compared recall accuracy at the first four positions against recall accuracy at the last four
positions.  Consistent with previous research on triage effects, the results were analyzed separately
for each developmental group in order to examine the trends separately for each cohort.
        The tests for both the total errors and trial of last error measures for the younger adults
showed that the main effects of Item, (F[3, 177] = 3.70, p < .01, and F[3, 177] = 3.62, p < .01,
respectively) and Quartile (F[1, 59] = 13.45, p < .01, and F[1, 59] = 16.72, p < .01, respectively) were
significant, as was their interaction (F[3, 177] = 7.75, p < .01, and F[3, 177] = 8.73, p < .01, respectively).
Basically performance was poorer for some of the items in the first quartile than for some of items in the
last quartile.  The tests for both the total errors and trial of last error measures for the older adults revealed
only a Quartile x Item interaction, (F[3, 177] = 4.57, p < .01, and F[3, 177] = 5.57, p < .01, respectively).
Unlike the younger adults, older adults’ performance was better for some of items in the first quartile than
for some of items in the last quartile.  This is consistent with the idea that older adults experience too much
interference initially to recall the weakest items and are forced to recall such items at the end of the
protocol when episodic activation is highest.  As well, the younger adults’ U-shaped curves had longer left
than right arms, whereas the U-shaped curves produced by older adults had longer right than left arms.
This indicates that older adults experienced the build-up of interference at the beginning of the protocol
more quickly than younger adults did, something that forces them to switch to the recall of stronger words
much earlier than do younger adults.  This accounts for the shorter left arms in the U-shaped curves of the
older than younger adults.  Because many of the weak items can then only be recalled at the end of the
protocol when activation is high, this accounts for the longer right arms produced by the older than
younger adults.
        The second developmental difference noted by Brainerd et al. (1990) was that age changes in
recall accuracy interacted with output position; that is, age differences in recall accuracy were
smaller at the initial recall positions than at subsequent positions.  To determine whether age
differences in cumulative recall accuracy tended to diverge as protocols unfolded, Age x Recall
position ANOVAs were conducted using either total errors to criterion or trial of last error as the
performance measure.  Of interest is the Age x Recall position interaction because it will be
reliable if age differences in accuracy increased as recall position increased.  (The Age and Recall
position main effects are both trivial because we have previously found both effects to be
significant.)  Two such analyses of variance (for each of the two measures of recall accuracy)
were conducted for the criterion 1 trial.  The Age x Recall position interaction was reliable for
both ANOVAs, the total errors measure, F(15, 1770) = 1.65, p = .05, indicating that age differences in
recall accuracy increased with recall position, and the trial of last error measure, F(15, 1770) = 1.71, p <
.05, indicating that age differences in the trial of last error increased with recall position.  Therefore, these
results show that older adults experience more output interference initially than younger adults and this
difference becomes greater as additional items are recalled.
            Discussion
Based on past research with children, triage has been demonstrated to be a rather reliable effect,
one that enhances free recall (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2001).  The current experiment is the first to
examine developmental differences in triage in adult free recall.  Consistent with the previous work with
children, our study has shown that for younger and older adults, both recall accuracy and recall order were
nonmonotonically related; that is, the triage pattern existed in both of the younger and older adults’ recall.
Thus, like the findings for cognitive triage with children, when adults retrieve words under unconstrained
recall conditions, they do not simply read out the stronger items first.  Rather, weaker items are recalled
initially, followed by stronger items, followed by the remaining weaker items.
Interestingly, the amount of variance accounted for by the quadratic fits (59% to 93% for
the younger adults and 57% to 83% for the older adults) appears to be somewhat lower than has
been reported with children (74% to 96% by Brainerd et al., 1990).  This difference might reflect
adults’ greater reliance on recall strategies, strategies that might interfere with the on-line process
of reporting weak words whenever output interference is low.  This is consistent with the
anecdotal observation, reported by some of the participants, that they constructed a story from the
list items as they were initially shown and then reported the items at recall by mentally recounting
the story.  Although the unconscious process of noting items’ error-success history could still play
a major role in recall, those participants who utilize some type of conscious recall strategy would
likely display a less marked triage pattern.  Brainerd, Olney, and Reyna (1993) did find that
selective rehearsal decreased the triage effect.  In particular, the use of this strategy affected the
low-priority component of triage.  The fact that preadolescents spontaneously use mnemonics
such as elaboration less frequently than adults (for a review, see Bjorklund & Muir, 1988), and that
Brainerd et al. (1990) tested children during the optimal time for verbatim memory development, may
account for what appears to be stronger triage patterns found in children’s recall than those found in the
present study with younger and older adults.  Thus, although there is a clear invariance in cognitive triage
across the lifespan, there are some interesting, although perhaps subtle, differences in the strength of these
patterns, ones that may be directly related to adults’ increasing reliance on the use of conscious recall
strategies to support episodic memory.
         As expected, recall performance was poorer for older than younger adults.  Age differences in triage
were also anticipated given older adults’ greater susceptibility to output interference.  The position in the
output queue where recall was poorest varied with age and age differences increased with recall position.
This is consistent with the idea that older adults experience too much interference initially to recall the
weakest items and are forced to recall such items at the end of the protocol when episodic activation is
highest.  As well, these findings are consistent with the idea that older adults experience the build-up of
interference at the beginning of the protocol more quickly than younger adults do, something that forces
them to switch to the recall of stronger words much earlier than do younger adults.  Therefore, the pattern
of cognitive triage becomes less marked from younger to older adulthood because of the apparent increase
in interference that adults experience with increasing age.  Thus, our findings are consistent with prior
research indicating that older adults experience greater verbatim forgetting and are more susceptible to
output interference (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001).  Moreover, the results are also consistent with theories that
make claims concerning global processing declines with age (e.g., Dempster, 1992; 1993; Myerson,
Ferraro, Hale, & Lima, 1992), as well as theories that make more specific claims, for example, of greater
susceptibility to output interference, like fuzzy-trace theory.   However, it is possible that age changes in
cognitive triage are more a function of inhibition efficiency than resistance to interference.  Given that
there are developmental differences in the ability to suppress memory nodes (see Wilson & Kipp, 1998), it
is possible that younger children and older adults have more difficulty both unintentionally inhibiting items
that are associated with the target item as well as intentionally inhibiting previously recalled items that
enter working memory, and that these deficiencies produce the triage pattern of recall.  In other words, the
locus of competition may not be prior to entry into working memory (as implied by FTT), but after items
have entered consciousness (see the distinction between sensitivity to interference theory and inhibition
efficiency theory in Wilson and Kipp, 1998).
        Interestingly, the triage pattern was not as evident when the second criterion trial was used as
the index of recall order.  According to fuzzy-trace theory, the order of recall should be a
nonmonotonic function of memory strength when either criterion trial is used as the index of
recall order.  With the exception of Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, and Kevershan (1991) who found a
nonmonotonic relationship with the second criterion trial, results have typically not been reported
for each criterion trial.  One possible explanation for why there is a difference between the two
criterion trials is that when assessing an item’s strength, participants place more weight on their
performance on the previous trial than they do on the entire error-success history of the item.
Because all items may now be classified as strong or at least somewhat strong by the time of the
second criterion trial, and because the high level of episodic activation would have forced the
level of output interference to dissipate, it would therefore not be necessary for recall to strictly
follow the weak-strong-weak pattern to achieve maximum performance.
It is interesting to note the connection between prior research on cognitive triage and current false
memory research in terms of the relationship between recall of list words versus intrusions. One finding in
the false memory literature is that recall of related but unpresented words (semantic intrusions) often
occurs near the end of a free recall test (e.g., Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996).  According to
FTT, because recall is based on verbatim traces early in recall and gist traces later in recall, and because
output interference builds with the recall of verbatim traces but gist representations are unaffected by such
interference, items are generated from gist representations later in recall.  Because intrusions are said to be
gist-based, such falsely remembered items should occur in the latter portions of output queues when gist
output is highest.  Consistent with FTT’s assumptions, Barnhardt, Choi, Gerkens, and Smith (2006) found
that the output position of presented related words, which would be based on verbatim representations
according to FTT, was earlier than the output position of nonpresented related intrusions, which would be
based on gist representations.  Importantly, the output positions of both types of words were closer to the
middle segments of the output queues than to the ends of the recall protocols.  Barnhardt et al. (2006)
argued that presented related items should produce the strongest verbatim trace because those items can
take advantage of both item-specific and relational processes at study.  Thus, they should be the last items
recalled via direct access given that recall initially follows a weak-strong pattern due to the build-up of
output interference.  Nonpresented related intrusions were recalled shortly after recall of the presented
related items because the output order for traces reconstructed from gist is argued to proceed from the
strongest to the weakest traces.
Another consistent finding in the false memory literature is that intrusion rates are not always
positively correlated with the level of true recall, and in fact, some research has found a negative
correlation (see Gallo, 2006).  Consistent with this finding, Brainerd, Yang, Reyna, Howe, and Mills
(2008) found that true and false recall loaded on different factors, with true recall loading on surface
features such as imagery/concreteness and categorizability ratings of target words and false recall loading
on a familiarity/meaningfulness factor.  Brainerd et al. (2008) argued that their findings indicate that there
are discrete representations for true and false memory at recall and provides support the output patterns
found in the Payne et al. (1996) and Barnhardt et al. (2006) studies.  Although output positions for true and
false memories may conform to patterns derived from cognitive triage, this degree of conformity may
depend on exactly how memory strength is measured (e.g., recall accuracy, number of study trials, amount
of study time) (also see Jou, 2008; Rohrer & Wixted, 1994; Wixted, Ghadisha, & Vera, 1997).
Regardless of these measurement issues, the link between triage patterns and true and false recall
opens up new and theoretically interesting research opportunities for better understanding memory
development in both childhood and adulthood (also see Howe, 2008).  Indeed, the research presented in
this article establishes the existence of triage effects in both younger and older adults and serves as an
important first investigation of developmental differences in these cognitive triage patterns in adult free
recall.  The major implication of our findings is that there is evidence of cognitive triage in adults’ free
recall.  Despite this developmental invariance in cognitive triage across the lifespan, there are some
important differences between children’s triage patterns and those of adults.  Indeed, this research showed
that the pattern of cognitive triage is somewhat weaker in adults than children, something that may be due
to (a) adults’ increased reliance on conscious mnemonic strategies to enhance episodic recall or (b)
increases in adults’ susceptibility to interference in memory and their reduced ability to inhibit information
during episodic recall.
The current research also raises a number of important questions about the nature of episodic recall
in adult memory development.  For example, is cognitive triage a viable explanation of developmental
changes in recall throughout adulthood?  That is, do these age changes we observed in cognitive triage
patterns bring about the well-documented age changes that we see in recall throughout adulthood?  As
well, we need to determine whether, and to what degree, the spontaneous use of recall strategies interferes
with the cognitive triage pattern (e.g., older adults’ increased reliance on semantic processing) and whether
such use produces less marked triage patterns with adults (who are considerably more proficient in strategy
use) than with children (who are only beginning to learn how to implement strategic processes).  Because it
has been shown that cognitive triage can enhance recall, it may be that the use of more intentional
strategies could impede this more “automatic” form of free recall (Howe, 2008).  This calls into question
the central assumption of the mnemonic approach to memory development inasmuch as the efficient use of
conscious mnemonic strategies may not serve to optimize recall (Harnishfeger & Brainerd, 1994), but
rather, act to interfere with an already effective cognitive triage mechanism.  Alternatively, these more
sophisticated mnemonic strategies might produce better recall in more trying memory circumstances than
the ones used in triage research (e.g., prospective remembering), something that is important if we are to
have a complete theory of memory development across the lifespan.  Through a better understanding of the
nature of triage, we will gain insight into the more automatic as well as the more conscious components
that constitute lifespan changes in memory, and in the end, have a more comprehensive theory of the key
changes that constitute memory development in both childhood and adulthood.
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Table 1
Means (and Standard Deviations) for the Relationship Between Recall Order and Recall Accuracy
for Criterion 1
Recall Order (Vincentized quartiles)
Age/Measure                                       1                      2                      3                      4
Younger
            Mean Total Errors                   1.48                 0.97                 0.86                 1.05
(1.17)                (1.05)                 (0.87)           (1.04)
            Mean Last Error                                  1.88                 1.09                 1.01                 1.25
(1.56)                 (1.26)                (1.11)           (1.31)
Older
            Mean Total Errors                   1.70                 1.35                 1.42                 1.85
(1.53)                (1.30)                 (1.22)                (1.44)
            Mean Last Error                                  2.30                 1.83                 1.81                 2.52
                                                                (2.12)                (1.82)                (1.65)                    (2.03)
Table 2
Means (and Standard Deviations) for the Relationship Between Recall Order and Recall Accuracy
for Criterion 2
                                                                        Recall Order (Vincentized quartiles)
Age/Measure                                       1                      2                      3                      4
Younger
            Mean Total Errors                   1.22                 0.96                 1.06                 1.13
(1.20)               (0.99)                  (0.91)           (1.17)
            Mean Last Error                                  1.51                 1.15                 1.22                 1.35
(1.56)                (1.27)                 (1.14)           (1.46)
Older
            Mean Total Errors                   1.62                 1.41                 1.45                 1.84
(1.47)                (1.22)                (1.37)            (1.47)
            Mean Last Error                                  2.19                 1.89                 1.91                 2.47
                                                                (1.90)                (1.69)                (1.83)                    (1.95)
